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Abstract Fairness can be incorporated into Harsanyi’s utilitarianism through
all-inclusive utility. This retains the normative assumptions of expected utility and
Pareto-efficiency, and relates fairness to individual preferences. It makes utilitarian-
ism unfalsifiable, however, if agents’ all-inclusive utilities are not explicitly specified.
This note proposes a two-stage model to make utilitarian welfare analysis falsifiable by
specifying all-inclusive utilities explicitly through models of individual fairness pref-
erences. The approach is applied to include fairness in widely discussed allocation
examples.
Keywords Utilitarianism · Outcome fairness · Process fairness · All-inclusive
utility
1 Introduction
Harsanyi (1955) derived the utilitarian social welfare function assuming expected
utility for individuals and the social planner, and assuming the Pareto-principle. The
result has been criticized because the linear form of the social welfare function, alleg-
edly, precludes considerations of fairness by the social planner. Fairness can be incor-
porated into Harsanyi’s framework through a description of social allocations that
includes, apart from the individuals’ personal situations, all interpersonal compari-
sons (Harsanyi 1955; Broome 1991; Binmore 1994; Karni 1996). Individual utilities
over these complete descriptions of allocations are all-inclusive.
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The all-inclusive utility approach allows the social welfare function to be based
on the normatively convincing assumptions of expected utility and Pareto-efficiency,
while considering agents’ individual attitudes towards fairness. Fairness has a clear
interpretation in terms of individual preferences and need not be considered separately
by the social planner (Fischer and Torgler 2006; van Winden 2007). Without explicit
specification of the individual fairness preferences, however, the approach deprives
Harsanyi’s theory from predictive power and makes it unfalsifiable. Utility becomes
context-dependent and every preference of the social planner between allocations can
be accommodated by including all fairness issues in the agents’ utilities. This has
usually been the stalemate position in which debates about utilitarianism end, with
either accepting the unsatisfactory lack of fairness considerations or accepting a loss
of operationality.
This article offers a way out of the stalemate based on models of individual fairness
preferences. The predictive power and falsifiability of utilitarianism with all-inclusive
utility can be maintained by explicitly specifying testable and context-independent fair-
ness preferences for individuals. A model is introduced that applies Sugden’s (2000)
two-stage procedure for game theory to operationalize fairness in all- inclusive util-
ity and give empirical meaning to fairness in Harsanyi’s utilitarianism. At the first
stage, agents evaluate risky outcomes (health states, wealth levels) by self-interested
von Neumann–Morgenstern (vNM) utilities that evaluate risky options without social
comparison. No fairness considerations enter at this stage. At the second stage, the
self-interested vNM utilities are then taken as inputs in models of individual fairness
(Fehr and Schmidt 1999; Trautmann 2007) to obtain all-inclusive vNM utilities. These
models provide operational functional forms for fairness preferences and successfully
explain empirical data. They can numerically be assessed for individual agents from
observable choices.
The two-stage approach is applied to well-known examples by Diamond (1967)
and Broome (1991) which criticize utilitarianism on fairness grounds. Distinguishing
between self-interested and all-inclusive vNM utilities allows us to derive convincing
empirical predictions in these examples under utilitarianism.
The article is organized as follows. The next section discusses fairness-based crit-
icisms of utilitarianism and all-inclusive utility. Section 3 introduces the two-stage
model to operationalize fairness and obtain meaningful all-inclusive utilities. Section 4
applies the approach to analyze Diamond’s and Broome’s examples with individual
fairness preferences. Section 5 discusses the results and the last section concludes.
2 Utilitarianism, fairness, and all-inclusive utility
Harsanyi (1955) used cardinal utility obtained from choices between risky allocations
to derive a social welfare function. He assumed that the social planner and the indi-
vidual agents use expected utility to evaluate risky prospects over outcomes, and that
the Pareto-principle holds. The latter requires that indifference between two prospects
for each individual imply indifference from the social standpoint. Harsanyi showed
that these three assumptions imply a social welfare function W of the utilitarian form,
W = ∑i Ui , where the Ui ’s are the individual agents’ vNM utilities over outcomes.
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Fig. 1 Random allocation of
utilities in Diamond’s example
Fig. 2 Random allocation of
utilities in Broome’s example
2.1 Fairness-based criticisms of utilitarianism
Harsanyi’s result has been criticized because of the absence of fairness considerations
in the evaluation of the utilitarian social planner. Consider the following two examples
in which the utilitarian prediction of which random allocation should be preferred by
society has been argued not to be convincing.
Example 1 (Diamond 1967) Consider the two random allocations P and Q of utilities
for agents A and B in Fig. 1.
Under utilitarianism the planner is indifferent between procedures P and Q because
both imply an expected social welfare of 1. Indifference can be unconvincing because
with procedure P agent B will receive nothing while A receives positive utility for
sure. With procedure Q both agents have a fair chance of the same utility.
Example 2 (Broome 1991, p. 185) Consider the allocations in Fig. 2.
Under utilitarianism the planner is indifferent between procedures P and Q because
both imply an expected welfare of 1. Indifference can be unconvincing because allo-
cation procedure P always leads to equality in terms of utilities, while Q always leads
to inequality.
In Diamond’s example utilitarianism violates process fairness, and in Broome’s
example it violates outcome fairness.
2.2 Non-utilitarian social welfare versus all-inclusive utility
In order to incorporate fairness in Harsanyi’s framework, two approaches can be fol-
lowed. First, the assumptions of expected utility and Pareto-efficiency can be weak-
ened and a non-utilitarian social welfare function can be derived that accounts for
fairness preferences of the social planner (Epstein and Segal 1992; Kelsey 1994;
Wakker and Zank 1999; Grant et al. 2006; Zank 2007). However, it is not obvious
that a social welfare function should be based on the assumption of non-expected
utility evaluation of risky prospects by the social planner. Further, it is not clear whose
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fairness preferences are represented by this social evaluation if no agent in the society
individually cares about fairness (van Winden 2007).
Second, it can be assumed that the description of the social allocations does not only
include the individual agents’ personal outcomes, but also all possible interpersonal
comparisons (Harsanyi 1955; Luce and Raiffa 1957; Broome 1991; Binmore 1994;
Karni 1996). The agents’ vNM utilities of a social allocation, which are used in the
social evaluation of the allocation, are all-inclusive.
The second approach seems normatively more convincing because it retains
expected utility and Pareto-efficiency, and derives fairness from individual preferences
(Karni 1996; Karni and Safra 2002). In particular, the individual fairness preferences
may differ across agents. All-inclusive utility, however, also suffers from problems if
taken in full generality. When observing an empirical violation of utilitarianism, it can
always be argued that a refined description of outcomes that explicitly incorporates
fairness can accommodate the empirically observed social preference. Thus, utilitari-
anism is deprived from predictive power and becomes unfalsifiable, as illustrated by
the following example.
Example 3 Consider again Example 2 and interpret the entries as all-inclusive vNM
utilities. The social planner is indifferent between both procedures under utilitari-
anism. Now consider a new decision for the planner that is identical to the one in
Example 2, except that probabilities under procedure Q are 0.25 for the upper branch
and 0.75 for the lower branch. Assume that the all-inclusive utilities of the two agents
in Fig. 2 are due to a purely selfish utility evaluation of outcomes, that is, agents do
not care about fairness. Then the social choice with new procedure Q is given by the
entries in Fig. 3. The planner is indifferent because the expected social welfare is equal
to 1 for both procedures.
Alternatively, the all-inclusive utilities in Example 2 when taken completely gen-
eral may include individual preferences for fairness. Assume for instance that the
all-inclusive utilities depend on monetary payoffs and social comparisons of these
payoffs. Assume that agents prefer more money to less and that they also prefer smaller
interpersonal differences in expected payoffs because they value process fairness. The
Ui ’s in Fig. 2 then are functions of agent i’s own payoff and of the difference between
her own expected payoff and the other agent’s expected payoff. In this case, changing
the probability distribution under procedure Q affects the agents’ all-inclusive utili-
ties, because the difference between the agents’ expected payoffs changes. The social
choice is defined by the entries in Fig. 4 for unknown all-inclusive utilities a, b, c, and
d, and indifference of the planner need not hold because 0.25 (a + b) + 0.75 (c + d)
need not be equal to 1.
Fig. 3 Broome’s example with
different procedure Q: selfish
all-inclusive utilities
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Fig. 4 Broome’s example with
different procedure Q:
all-inclusive utilities when
agents care about differences
in expected payoffs
Assuming all-inclusive utilities, no prediction can be made about the society’s
decision in Example 3 based on the knowledge that the society is indifferent in Exam-
ple 2. Indifference in Example 2 can be due to either selfishness or preference for fair
expected outcomes, with very different implications for the social decision in Exam-
ple 3. Without explicit and falsifiable assumptions concerning individual fairness pref-
erences, the model with all-inclusive utility has no predictive power (Machina 1989;
Broome 1991). It cannot be applied to evaluate social allocations.
3 Operationalizing all-inclusive utility
3.1 The two-stage model
A two-stage model that is based on Sugden’s (2000) methodology to incorporate
social interaction in game-theoretic analyses is proposed to operationalize fairness
in all-inclusive utility. Let there be N agents with all-inclusive vNM utilities Ui and
a social planner with social welfare function W. ui denotes agent i’s self-interested
vNM utility and zi denotes her actual outcome. Welfare is evaluated by the following
model:
W =
N∑
i
Ui (utilitarianism) (3.1)
Ui = fi (u1, . . . , uN ) (second stage) (3.2)
ui = gi (zi ) (first stage) (3.3)
At the first stage, the agents’ individual outcomes (health states, wealth levels) are
evaluated through the self-interested vNM utilities that evaluate risky options without
social comparison. Agents consider only their personal situation, and no fairness con-
siderations enter at this stage. At the second stage, these self-interested vNM utilities
are then taken as inputs in models of individual fairness preferences fi (·) to obtain
all-inclusive vNM utilities for utilitarian welfare evaluation. An agent’s all-inclusive
utility may depend on both her own and all other agents’ self-interested utilities.
The first-stage self-interested utilities are functions of possibly non-numerical
outcomes. The second-stage all-inclusive utilities are functions of numerical self-
interested utilities. This allows for fairness comparisons also if outcomes are not
numerical as with health states. Differences or expected values of self-interested util-
ities of health states can be calculated at the second stage to obtain the all-inclusive
utilities.
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A tractable parametric model of individual fairness that can be used at the second
stage has been proposed by Fehr and Schmidt (1999). They consider individual pref-
erence for outcome fairness, that is, agents are averse to unequal outcomes. Trautmann
(2007) extends the model to individual preference for process fairness by assuming
aversion to unequal expected outcomes. Notice that outcome fairness and process fair-
ness refer to the allocation of self-interested utility in the application of these models in
the two-stage model. We will see that specifying individual fairness preferences explic-
itly through parametric models at the second stage makes all-inclusive utility opera-
tional and quantitatively formalizes the discussion of fairness under utilitarianism.
3.2 Models of individual fairness
Let the N agents face uncertainty about the allocation of self-interested utilities. Let Xi
denote the random variable from which agent i’s self-interested utilities will be drawn
and let E[Xi ] denote its expectation. Assuming that the agents dislike an unequal
ex-post allocation of self-interested utilities we apply the following all-inclusive util-
ity function, the Outcome Fehr–Schmidt Model (Fehr and Schmidt 1999), to account
for fairness preferences:
Ui (u1, . . ., uN )=ui− αiN−1
N∑
j =i
max{u j−ui , 0}− βiN−1
N∑
j =i
max{ui−u j , 0} (3.4)
with 0 ≤ βi < 1 and βi ≤ αi . This utility function takes the agent’s fairness prefer-
ences into account by reducing the all-inclusive utility in the case of unequal actual
self-interested utilities, i.e. ui = u j . The utility reduction is larger when the inequality
is disadvantageous (ui < u j ) than when it is advantageous (ui > u j ), because βi ≤ αi .
From βi < 1 it follows that the agent’s all-inclusive utility is always increasing in her
own self-interested utility, and non-negativity of the parameters implies that there is
no inequality seeking. The normalization of the fairness terms by N − 1 ensures that
the impact of fairness remains constant if the number of agents increases.
The outcome Fehr–Schmidt model provides an operational and tractable form to
model preferences for outcome fairness and has been very successful in predicting
empirical data. Evidence from experiments using random allocations has shown,
however, that agents also care about whether procedures are fair from the ex-ante
perspective (Cox and Deck 2005; Bolton et al. 2005). Using the basic form of the
Fehr–Schmidt model, but assuming that agents care about fair processes, Trautmann
(2007) proposed the following all-inclusive utility function, the Process Fehr–Schmidt
Model, that accounts for preferences for fairness by considering differences in the
expected self-interested utilities between the agents:
Ui (ui , X1, . . ., X N ) = ui − αiN − 1
N∑
j =i
max
{
E[X j ] − E[Xi ], 0
}
− βi
N − 1
N∑
j =i
max
{
E[Xi ] − E[X j ], 0
} (3.5)
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with 0 ≤ βi < 1 and βi ≤ αi . This utility function takes the agent’s fairness prefer-
ences into account by reducing the all-inclusive utility in the case of unequal expected
self-interested utilities, i.e. E[Xi ] = E[X j ]. As in the outcome Fehr–Schmidt model,
the utility reduction is larger when the inequality is disadvantageous than when it
is advantageous. Now βi < 1 implies that the agent’s expected all-inclusive utility
is increasing in expected own self-interested utility. Non-negativity of the parame-
ters implies that there is no ex-ante inequality seeking. The process model is able to
accommodate experimental data that the outcome model cannot explain.
Both fairness concepts have been found to matter empirically and the Fehr–Schmidt
type models successfully predict experimental data. Individual agents’ utility functions
can be assessed by observing their choices between actual allocations (u1, . . . , uN )
for the outcome model and risky allocations (ui , X1, . . . , X N ) for the process model
(Camerer and Fehr 2004; Rohde 2007). The self-interested vNM utilities can be as-
sessed through standard utility measurement procedures (Keeney and Raiffa 1976;
Wakker and Deneffe 1996; Abdellaoui 2000). Applying these tractable models there-
fore allows for a quantitative welfare evaluation under utilitarianism that is based on
empirically relevant individual attitudes towards fairness.
Process and outcome fairness are closely related to a priori and a posteriori fairness.
An agent with process fairness preferences takes the a priori view on fairness both
before and after the resolution of uncertainty. An agent with outcome fairness prefer-
ences takes the a posteriori view at both points (Machina 1989; Trautmann 2007).
4 Incorporating individual fairness in Diamond’s and Broome’s examples
We discuss Diamond’s (1967) and Broome’s (1991) examples of social choices
between random allocations when agents have Fehr–Schmidt preferences for either
outcome or process fairness and N = 2. We apply the two-stage procedure and as-
sume that the utilities in Figs. 1 and 2 are self-interested vNM utilities that have been
derived from self-interested choices between risky prospects over outcomes. These
self-interested utilities enter the second-stage fairness models as inputs to obtain all-
inclusive utilities. For agent A and B’s inequality aversion parameters in the outcome
and process Fehr–Schmidt model we assume for simplicity that αA =αB > 0 and
βA = βB > 0.
Example 1′ It has been shown above that without consideration of fairness the social
planner’s indifference between P and Q in Diamond’s example can be unconvincing.
Including fairness considerations at the individual level by applying the process Fehr–
Schmidt model (3.5) to the allocation of self-interested utility specified in Fig. 1, we
obtain the all-inclusive utilities given in Fig. 5.
Allocation procedure Q with expected welfare 1 is preferred over procedure P with
expected welfare 1 − α − β by the social planner if subjects hold the process fairness
view. The process model can immunize utilitarianism against the criticism raised by
Diamond’s example.
Applying the outcome Fehr–Schmidt model (3.4) to the example, we obtain the util-
ities given in Fig. 6. The utilitarian planner is indifferent between P and Q if subjects
care about outcome fairness: under both allocation procedures they will always obtain
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Fig. 5 Process Fehr–Schmidt
utilities in Diamond’s example
Fig. 6 Outcome Fehr–Schmidt
utilities in Diamond’s example
Fig. 7 Outcome Fehr–Schmidt
utilities in Broome’s example
the same degree of outcome inequality. The example’s criticism cannot be accommo-
dated because it is always B who is worse off under process P, making the society’s
indifference unconvincing.
Example 2′ In Broome’s example indifference between procedures P and Q may not
be convincing because Q always involves unequal self-interested vNM utilities while
P gives both agents equal self-interested VNM utilities in each state. Applying the
outcome Fehr–Schmidt model we obtain the all-inclusive utilities in Fig. 7.
Procedure P with expected welfare 1 is preferred over procedure Q that gives
expected welfare 1−α−β. Including preferences for outcome fairness in the utilitarian
welfare assessment accommodates the criticism raised by the example. If we apply the
process Fehr–Schmidt model (3.5) to the allocations in Fig. 2 to obtain all-inclusive
utilities, however, we obtain the same numbers as in Fig. 2: both subjects have equal
expected self-interested utility under both procedures and inequality aversion terms
drop out of the all-inclusive utility function. Both subjects, and therefore the social
planner, are indifferent between allocation procedure P and Q. Utilitarianism with
process fairness preferences does not account for the criticism raised by Broome’s
example.
The following table summarizes the appraisal of Harsanyi’s utilitarianism in the
two examples for the different fairness concepts.
Broome’s Diamond’s
example example
Self-interested − −
Outcome Fehr–Schmidt + −
Process Fehr–Schmidt − +
+, criticism accommodated; −, criticism not accommodated
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Applying self-interested individual utility in welfare assessments, the utilitarian
prediction of the planner’s preferences is not convincing for either example. Assuming
that individuals’ utilities include outcome fairness norms, utilitarianism can accommo-
date the criticism raised by Broome’s example. Assuming process fairness, Diamond’s
criticism can be accommodated.
5 Discussion
By observing individual preference for process fairness or outcome fairness, the social
planner can use the two-stage approach with the respective individual fairness model
to determine the optimal allocation under utilitarianism. The social welfare evaluation
considers fairness through all-inclusive utilities.
At the second stage, we used Fehr–Schmidt inequality aversion models to include
individual fairness preferences. However, other fairness models can be incorporated
in the two-stage approach if they appear more appropriate descriptions of individual
preferences. Examples include the outcome and process fairness models of Bolton
and Ockenfels (2000) and Bolton et al. (2005) that make different assumptions than
Fehr–Schmidt in the N -person case, or the model of Charness and Rabin (2002) in
which agents focus on efficiency and the worst-off person. Krawczyk (2007) pro-
vides a model of both outcome and process fairness. Gächter and Riedl (2006) and
Traub et al. (2006) discuss more complex fairness norms at the individual level for
which second-stage models could be developed and implemented through the two-
stage approach. Very different and possibly complex individual fairness notions can
be accommodated by utilitarianism with all-inclusive utility.
Diecidue (2006) derives utilitarianism from a book-making argument under cer-
tainty. He assumes that the planner aggregates over many economic policies and that
monetary equivalents exist for all consequences that the subjects face. Fairness can
be included in this model by applying the second stage fairness model to individual
monetary outcomes aggregated over all policies. These all-inclusive utilities can be
used in the calculation of the aggregate welfare.
For some individual fairness second-stage models the utilitarian prediction may
turn out to be identical to the prediction of some non-utilitarian social welfare model.
If the two-stage model and the non-utilitarian model are empirically indistinguish-
able, the non-utilitarian model might be seen as a reduced form of the true two-stage
utilitarian model (Machina 1984).
6 Conclusion
This article argues that fairness can be incorporated in Harsanyi’s (1955) utilitar-
ian welfare function at the individual level through all-inclusive utilities. A two-step
procedure is proposed that uses tractable parametric models of individual fairness to
operationalize all-inclusive utility. The approach retains Harsanyi’s normative assump-
tions and relates fairness in welfare evaluation to observable individual preferences.
Falsifiability and predictive power of utilitarianism are preserved.
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Fehr–Schmidt models of outcome and process fairness have been used to
accommodate fairness-based criticisms of utilitarianism. The two-stage model is, how-
ever, a flexible tool to incorporate fairness in utilitarian social welfare. If tractable mod-
els of individual fairness are available which are empirically more successful or allow
for more complex notions of fairness, then these can be used as well to incorporate
fairness in utilitarianism.
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